| Paper |
Title |
Other Keywords |
Page |
| MOPLT015 |
Reliability Issues of the LHC Beam Dumping System
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extraction, kicker, collider, hadron |
563 |
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- R. Filippini, E. Carlier, B. Goddard, J.A. Uythoven
CERN, Geneva
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The Beam Dumping System of the Large Hadron Collider, presently under construction at CERN, must function with utmost reliability to protect the personnel, minimize the risk of severe damage to the machine and avoid undue impact to the environment. The dumping action must be synchronized with the particle free gap and the field of the extraction and dilution elements must be well adjusted to the beam energy. The measures taken to arrive at a reliable and safe system will be described, like the adoption of fault tolerant design principles and other safety related features as comprehensive monitoring, diagnostics and protection facilities. These issues will be discussed in the general framework of the IEC standard recommendations for safety critical systems. Some examples related to the most critical functions will be included.
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| MOPLT034 |
Possible Causes and Consequences of Serious Failures of the LHC Machine Protection System
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extraction, injection, kicker, quadrupole |
620 |
| |
- J.A. Uythoven, R. Filippini, B. Goddard, M. Gyr, V. Kain, R. Schmidt, J. Wenninger
CERN, Geneva
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The LHC machine protection systems, including the beam dumping system, are designed to ensure that failures leading to serious damage to the LHC during its lifetime are extremely unlikely. These kind of failures have to date been considered as being ?beyond the design case?, for instance requiring a combination of equipment failure and surveillance failure. However, they need to be evaluated to determine the required safety levels of the protection systems. A second objective is to understand if measures can and should be taken to further reduce the probability of such failures, or to minimise their impact. This paper considers various serious failure modes of the different machine protection systems. The probable consequences and possible ameliorating measures of the worst-case scenarios are discussed. The particular case of having a stored beam with an unavailable beam dumping system is mentioned, together with possible actions to be taken in such an event.
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| MOPLT038 |
Conceptual Design of the LHC Beam Dumping Protection Elements TCDS and TCDQ
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proton, extraction, vacuum, instrumentation |
629 |
| |
- W.J.M. Weterings, B. Goddard, B. Riffaud, M. Sans Merce
CERN, Geneva
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The Beam Dumping System for the Large Hadron Collider, presently under construction at CERN, consists, per ring, of a set of horizontally deflecting extraction kicker magnets, vertically deflecting steel septa, dilution kickers and finally, a couple of hundred metres further downstream, an absorber block. A fixed diluter (TCDS) will protect the septa in the event of a beam dump that is not synchronised with the particle free gap or a spontaneous firing of the extraction kickers which will cause the beam to sweep over the septum. A mobile diluter block (TCDQ) will protect the superconducting quadrupole immediate downstream of the extraction as well as the arc at injection energy and the triplet aperture at top energy from bunches with small impact parameters. The conceptual design of the protection elements will be described, together with the status of the mechanical engineering.
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| WEPKF062 |
Study of the Quench Process in Fast-cycling Dipole for the SIS300 Ring
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dipole, power-supply, simulation, superconducting-magnet |
1744 |
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- I. Bogdanov, S. Kozub, A. Shcherbakov, L. Tkachenko, S. Zintchenko, V. Zubko
IHEP Protvino, Protvino, Moscow Region
- J. Kaugerts, G. Moritz
GSI, Darmstadt
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The results of numerical quench process simulation in the coil of superconducting dipole with magnetic field of 6 T and 100-mm aperture for high-energy ion and proton synchrotron facility SIS300 are presented. The peculiarities of quench process developed in dipole are discussed for several variants of quench conditions. The coil quench behavior determines the features, scopes, and limitations in possible quench protection scheme. Main design characteristics of the preferable protection system are considered.
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