IPAC2021 - List of Authors (Ninin, P.)

Paper	Title	Page
TUPAB314	SPS Personnel Protection System: From Design to Commissioning	2224
	T. Ladzinski, T. Hakulinen, F. Havart, V. Martins De Sousa Dos Rios, M. Munoz Codoceo, P. Ninin, J.P. Ridewood, E. Sanchez-Corral Mena, D. Vaxelaire CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland
	During the second long shutdown (LS2) of the accelerator complex at CERN, the access system of the Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) was completely renovated. This complex project was motivated by the technical obsolescence and lack of sufficient redundancy in the existing system, as well as by the need for homogenisation of technologies and practices across the different machines at CERN. The new Personnel Protection System includes 16 state-of-the-art access points making sure that only fully identified, trained and authorised personnel can enter the facility and an interlock system with a rationalized number of safety chains designed to meet the current safety standards. The control part is based on Siemens 1500 series of programmable logic controllers, complemented by a technologically diverse relay logic loop for the critical safety functions. This paper presents the new system and the design choices made to permit fast installation in a period where the access system itself was heavily used to allow vast upgrades of the SPS accelerator and its infrastructure. It also covers the verification and validation methodology and lessons learned during the commissioning phase.
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2021-TUPAB314
About •	paper received ※ 14 May 2021 paper accepted ※ 10 June 2021 issue date ※ 22 August 2021
Export •	reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

WEPAB283	CERN SPS Sprinkler System: A Customized Industrial Solution for a Non-Conventional Site	3313
	A. Suwalska, A. Arnalich, F. Deperraz, M. Munoz Codoceo, P. Ninin CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland
	Until 2018, the limited firefighting means in the SPS complex largely exposed it to the consequences of self-ignition or accidental fire. In 2015 the SPS Fire Safety project was launched with the objective of improving life safety and property protection by deploying a whole set of automatic actions to protect SPS in case of fire outbreak. If nothing was done, an unmanaged fire could be a threat to lives of those working underground and could mean losing a vast majority of the SPS machine and its equipment. In 2020, CERN has completed the consolidation of its SPS fire safety systems. Among these, a water based sprinkler system, following principles of standard industrial design but customized and tailor-made for SPS and its irradiated areas, is ready to operate. The system must take into account limitations related to the presence of fragile accelerator equipment, radioactive zones, integration constraints and comply with European norms, in particular EN12845. This paper presents the risk assessment, our experience from the planning and installation phase while discussing the custom-chosen and radiation tested equipment to end up with the lessons learned and outlook for the future.
	Poster WEPAB283 [2.224 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2021-WEPAB283
About •	paper received ※ 13 May 2021 paper accepted ※ 14 June 2021 issue date ※ 16 August 2021
Export •	reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

Paper

Title

Page

SPS Personnel Protection System: From Design to Commissioning

2224

T. Ladzinski, T. Hakulinen, F. Havart, V. Martins De Sousa Dos Rios, M. Munoz Codoceo, P. Ninin, J.P. Ridewood, E. Sanchez-Corral Mena, D. Vaxelaire
CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland

During the second long shutdown (LS2) of the accelerator complex at CERN, the access system of the Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) was completely renovated. This complex project was motivated by the technical obsolescence and lack of sufficient redundancy in the existing system, as well as by the need for homogenisation of technologies and practices across the different machines at CERN. The new Personnel Protection System includes 16 state-of-the-art access points making sure that only fully identified, trained and authorised personnel can enter the facility and an interlock system with a rationalized number of safety chains designed to meet the current safety standards. The control part is based on Siemens 1500 series of programmable logic controllers, complemented by a technologically diverse relay logic loop for the critical safety functions. This paper presents the new system and the design choices made to permit fast installation in a period where the access system itself was heavily used to allow vast upgrades of the SPS accelerator and its infrastructure. It also covers the verification and validation methodology and lessons learned during the commissioning phase.

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2021-TUPAB314

About •

paper received ※ 14 May 2021 paper accepted ※ 10 June 2021 issue date ※ 22 August 2021

Export •

reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

WEPAB283

CERN SPS Sprinkler System: A Customized Industrial Solution for a Non-Conventional Site

3313

A. Suwalska, A. Arnalich, F. Deperraz, M. Munoz Codoceo, P. Ninin
CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland

Until 2018, the limited firefighting means in the SPS complex largely exposed it to the consequences of self-ignition or accidental fire. In 2015 the SPS Fire Safety project was launched with the objective of improving life safety and property protection by deploying a whole set of automatic actions to protect SPS in case of fire outbreak. If nothing was done, an unmanaged fire could be a threat to lives of those working underground and could mean losing a vast majority of the SPS machine and its equipment. In 2020, CERN has completed the consolidation of its SPS fire safety systems. Among these, a water based sprinkler system, following principles of standard industrial design but customized and tailor-made for SPS and its irradiated areas, is ready to operate. The system must take into account limitations related to the presence of fragile accelerator equipment, radioactive zones, integration constraints and comply with European norms, in particular EN12845. This paper presents the risk assessment, our experience from the planning and installation phase while discussing the custom-chosen and radiation tested equipment to end up with the lessons learned and outlook for the future.

Poster WEPAB283 [2.224 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2021-WEPAB283

About •

paper received ※ 13 May 2021 paper accepted ※ 14 June 2021 issue date ※ 16 August 2021

Export •

reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)