Paper |
Title |
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WEPMP040 |
Machine Protection Aspects of High-Voltage Flashovers of the LHC Beam Dump Dilution Kickers |
2418 |
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- C. Wiesner, W. Bartmann, C. Bracco, M. Calviani, E. Carlier, L. Ducimetière, M.I. Frankl, M.A. Fraser, S.S. Gilardoni, B. Goddard, V. Gomes Namora, T. Kramer, A. Lechner, N. Magnin, M. Meddahi, A. Perillo-Marcone, T. Polzin, L.C. Richtmann, V. Rizzoglio, V. Senaj, J.A.F. Somoza, D. Wollmann
CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland
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The LHC Beam Dump System is required to safely dispose of the energy of the stored beam. In order to reduce the energy density deposited in the beam dump, a dedicated dilution system is installed. On July 14, 2018, during a regular beam dump at 6.5 TeV beam energy, a high-voltage flashover of two vertical dilution kickers was observed, leading to a voltage breakdown and reduced dilution in the vertical plane. It was the first incident of this type since the start of LHC beam operation. In this paper, the flashover event is described and the implications analysed. Circuit simulations of the current in the magnet coil as well as simulations of the resulting beam sweep pattern are presented and compared with the measurements. The criticality of the event is assessed and implications for future failure scenarios are discussed.
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DOI • |
reference for this paper
※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2019-WEPMP040
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About • |
paper received ※ 14 May 2019 paper accepted ※ 20 May 2019 issue date ※ 21 June 2019 |
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THPRB031 |
Operational Performance of the Machine Protection Systems of the Large Hadron Collider During Run 2 and Lessons Learnt for the LIU/HL-LHC Era |
3875 |
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- M. Zerlauth, A. Antoine, W. Bartmann, C. Bracco, E. Carlier, Z. Charifoulline, R. Denz, B. Goddard, A. Lechner, N. Magnin, C. Martin, R. Mompo, S. Redaelli, I. Romera, B. Salvachua, R. Schmidt, J.A. Uythoven, A.P. Verweij, J. Wenninger, C. Wiesner, D. Wollmann, C. Zamantzas
CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
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The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) has successfully completed its second operational run of four years length in December 2018. Operation will be stopped during two years for maintenance and upgrades. To allow for the successful completion of the diverse physics program at 6.5 TeV, the LHC has been routinely operating with stored beam energies close to 300 MJ per beam during high intensity proton runs as well as being frequently reconfigured to allow for special physic runs and important machine developments. No significant damage has incurred to the protected accelerator equipment throughout the run thanks to the excellent performance of the various machine protection systems, however a number of important observations and new failure scenarios have been identified, which were studied experimentally as well as through detailed simulations. In this contribution, we provide an overview of the performance of the machine protection systems throughout Run 2 as well as the important lessons learnt that will impact consolidation actions and the upgrade of the machine protection systems for the LIU/HL-LHC era.
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DOI • |
reference for this paper
※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2019-THPRB031
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About • |
paper received ※ 15 May 2019 paper accepted ※ 22 May 2019 issue date ※ 21 June 2019 |
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THPRB113 |
Concept of Beam-Related Machine Protection for the Future Circular Collider |
4085 |
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- Y.C. Nie, R. Schmidt, J.A. Uythoven, C. Wiesner, D. Wollmann, M. Zerlauth
CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
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In the Future Circular Collider (FCC) study, a proton-proton circular collider (FCC-hh) is considered with a stored beam energy 20 times higher than that of the LHC. Any uncontrolled release of such energy could potentially result in severe damage to the accelerator components. Machine protection of the FCC-hh is hence very important and challenging. With a machine-protection strategy similar to the LHC, FCC would require up to three turns to dump the beam synchronously after a failure detection. Due to several possible ultrafast failures, which could lead to significant beam losses in a few turns, it is important to further reduce the reaction time of the machine protection system (MPS) for the FCC. Reducing the detection time of a failure by using faster beam monitors, e.g. diamond detectors, can reduce the time between a beam loss and the beam dump request. Communication delay of the interlock system to the beam dumping system can be reduced by using a more direct signal path. More than one beam-free abort gap will shorten the time required for the synchronization between the abort gap and the extraction kicker. Different failure scenarios are classified according to the speed of the failure onset and the subsequent increase of induced beam losses. The critical failure modes, their potential mitigations and impacts on the design of the MPS are presented.
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DOI • |
reference for this paper
※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2019-THPRB113
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About • |
paper received ※ 14 May 2019 paper accepted ※ 23 May 2019 issue date ※ 21 June 2019 |
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