Development of a Machine Protection System for the Superconducting Beam Test Facility at Fermilab *

A. Warner[#], L. Carmichael, M. Church, R. Neswold

FNAL, Batavia IL, U.S.A,

* FNAL is operated by Fermi Research Alliance, LLC under Contract No. DE-AC02-07CH11359 with the United States Department of Energy. ¹warner@fnal.gov

Abstract

The Fermilab's Superconducting RF Beam Test Facility currently under construction will produce electron beams capable of damaging the acceleration structures and the beam line vacuum chambers in the event of an aberrant accelerator pulse. The accelerator is being designed with the capability to operate with up to 3000 bunches per macro-pulse, 5Hz repetition rate and 1.5 GeV beam energy. It will be able to sustain an average beam power of 72 KW at the bunch charge of 3.2 nC. Operation at full intensity will deposit enough energy in niobium material to approach the melting point of 2500 C. In the early phase with only 3 cryomodules installed the facility will be capable of generating electron beam energies of 810 MeV and an average beam power that approaches 40 KW. In either case a robust Machine Protection System (MPS) is required to mitigate effects due to such large damage potentials. This paper will describe the MPS system being developed, the system requirements and the controls issues under consideration.



Introduction

The beam at Fermilab's New Superconducting RF Beam Test Facility [1], when operational, will need systems to protect critical components from beam induced damages such as beam pipe collision and excessive beam losses. The MPS must therefore identify hazardous conditions and then take the appropriate action before damage is caused. Since the loss of a full bunch train can result in significant damage, the MPS must be able to interrupt the beam within a macro-pulse and keep the number of bunches below the damage potential once the protection system reacts; the goal is to keep the number of bunches on the order of 3-6 bunches. With the high possible bunch frequency of 3 MHz this necessitates a reaction time in the range of 1-2 µs with cable delay included for the 134 metre long machine. The MPS will use the status of critical sub-systems and losses measured by a fast Beam Loss Monitor (BLM) system, using scintillators and photomultiplier tubes (PMT) to identify potential faults. Once a fault is observed, the MPS can then stop or reduce beam intensity by removing the permit from different beam actuators, including the laser pulse controller.

Parameter	ILC RF unit	range
	test	
bunch charge	3.2 nC	0.05 nC to >20 nC
bunch spacing	333 nsec	<12 nsec to 0.1 sec
bunch train length	1 msec	1 bunch to 1 msec
bunch train repetition	5 Hz	0.1 Hz to 5 Hz
rate		
norm. transverse	~10 mm	~1 mm to ~50 mm
emittance		
RMS bunch length	1 ps	100 fs to 20 ps
peak bunch current	3 kA	10 kA

injeo	ction energy	40 MeV	5 MeV to 50 MeV
high	energy	810 MeV	40 MeV to 1500 MeV

Table 1: Beam Parameters



Figure 2 : MPS Overview

Fast Beam Loss Monitors



Several types of beam loss monitors (BLMs) will be used for the detection of electromagnetic showers. The fast protection system is being designed to interrupt the beam within a macro-pulse and will rely heavily on the ability to detect and react to losses within a few nanoseconds; for this reason the primary loss monitors for fast protection are made of plastic scintillator with photomultipliers attached and have already been designed, built and tested. Figure 3: shows some measurement results.

EJ208 Scintillator properties

Light attenuation length 1/e

Wavelength of max emission 435 nm

Scintillator Brightness

Detector sensitivity

Number of electrons

|Supply voltage (max)

Rise time

Decay time

Density

Rise time

Gain (min)

Sensitivity

Laser Pulse Control

The simplified overview block diagram of the proposed MPS is shown in Figure 2. The MPS has connections to several external devices and sub-systems. The top layer comprises signal providers such as fast beam loss monitors, RF signals, quench protection, toroid transmission, vacuum, magnet power supplies and more. All devices in this category send status information to the MPS logic layer (permit system). Only simple digital signals (e.g. on-off, OK-not OK) are transmitted. All devices or subsystems that are determined to be pertinent to protecting the machine or necessary for machine configuration are included here. The state of the machine is determined from this comprehensive overview of the inputs and allowable operational modes are determined based on this information by the middle logic layer. The main goals for the MPS system as a whole are:

Protection System

Overview

- Provide precise protection of all critical components by first determining the fault severity (high, intermediate, etc) and then taking the appropriate action to avoid damage.
- Allow for high availability by ensuring that the maximum requested beam intensity is allowed for the detected fault severity.
- Monitor MPS components and perform periodic self-checks in order to ensure robustness and a high level of reliability.
- Provide well-integrated, user-friendly tools for fault visualization, control and post-mortem analysis.

macro-pulse **1 ms** Number of bunches dynamically reduced time 333 ns 200 ms (3 MHz) (5Hz) Reaction time of $2 \mu s => 6$ unches remain

MPS should allow the machine to be up most of the time for user operations:

We could dynamically reduce the intensity by some factor based on the type of loss, where it occurs and no. of trips. Do this until we are below damage limits.

Cryogenic Loss Monitors



Although loss monitors are typically one of the main diagnostics for protecting the accelerator from beam induces damage. Most accelerator facilities do not cover the cold sections of the machine with loss monitors. To address these issues a Cryogenic Loss Monitor (CLM) ionization chamber capable of operation in the cold sections of a cryomodule has been developed and will be installed and tested [2]. The monitor electronics have been optimized to be sensitive to DC losses and the signals from these devices will be used to study and quantify dark current losses in particular, see figure 4. In order to increase the resolution bandwidth and the response time of the devices a new scheme which uses a Field **Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) based Time-to-Digital converter (TDC) method is** implemented [3] instead of a standard pulse counting method.

Paramet

Detector Operation

Mechanical

He-volume

Fill pressure

Diameter

Sensitivity

Electronic I/O

Ballast resistor

Supply voltage

Supply current

Frequency out

Offset current

Offset current drift

Operating temperature

Environmental

Magnetic field

Charge per pulse

Length

Symbol

RB

Vdd

Idd

Qp

Ioff

dIoff/dT

Min

4.5 V

5K

Typ.

120 cm³

1.0 bar

2.73 inch

11.2 inch

-95 V

1.9 pA / (Rad/hr)

6.84 nC/Rad

1.0 MΩ

5.0 V

105 mA

2.286 pC

0.831Hz / (Rad/hr)

100 pA

Max

-120 V

5.5 V

10 pA/K

350K

TBD

Comment

absolute

without shroud

without shroud

on chamber

calculated

calculated

safety resistor

after offset of 100 Hz nominal

chamber only





Figure 3 : FBLM Showing pulsed beam loss



Value

PMT Specifications

1.0 ns

3.3 ns

210 cm

3-5 ns

3.37/cm³

 2.7×10^{5}

2000 volts

0.1 - 200 A/lm

76 p.e./ MeV

7.0 pC/Mev

1.023 g/cc

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Figure 4 : reaction of CLM to dark current losses

Controls System

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