|TURAULT01||Summary of the 3rd Control System Cyber-security (CS)2/HEP Workshop||603|
Over the last decade modern accelerator and experiment control systems have increasingly been based on commercial-off-the-shelf products (VME crates, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, etc.), on Windows or Linux PCs, and on communication infrastructures using Ethernet and TCP/IP. Despite the benefits coming with this (r)evolution, new vulnerabilities are inherited, too: Worms and viruses spread within seconds via the Ethernet cable, and attackers are becoming interested in control systems. The Stuxnet worm of 2010 against a particular Siemens PLC is a unique example for a sophisticated attack against control systems . Unfortunately, control PCs cannot be patched as fast as office PCs. Even worse, vulnerability scans at CERN using standard IT tools have shown that commercial automation systems lack fundamental security precautions: Some systems crashed during the scan, others could easily be stopped or their process data being altered . The 3rd (CS)2/HEP workshop  held the weekend before the ICALEPCS2011 conference was intended to raise awareness; exchange good practices, ideas, and implementations; discuss what works & what not as well as their pros & cons; report on security events, lessons learned & successes; and update on progresses made at HEP laboratories around the world in order to secure control systems. This presentation will give a summary of the solutions planned, deployed and the experience gained.
 S. Lüders, "Stuxnet and the Impact on Accelerator Control Systems", FRAAULT02, ICALEPCS, Grenoble, October 2011;
 S. Lüders, "Control Systems Under Attack?", O5_008, ICALEPCS, Geneva, October 2005.
 3rd Control System Cyber-Security CS2/HEP Workshop, http://indico.cern.ch/conferenceDisplay.py?confId=120418