SPMS Security Issues

JACoW Team Meeting 2011 – SINAP

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Current security flaws

- SPMS is Oracle-based, installed in the Regional Support Centres
- The Upload/Download scripts are Perl-based, and run on a different server (the conference FileServer)
- The scripts do NOT have access to the DB for security reasons
 - Different institutes/teams/policies
 - Shared Oracle servers / conference server



URL spoofing

- By knowing the syntax of a Download URL it is possible to download whatever other Paper you want
- By building a well done HTML form, it is also possible to inject files onto the conference fileserver
 - Limited to the "papers" directory (O.S. is safe!)
 - All versions are kept and logs taken



Possible methods of security enhancement

- Connection to the DB (impossible for security reasons)
- Shared password (needs to be passed via HTTP insecure)
- Web Server "source" (SPMS) control (Apache, IIS, ...) custom and non standard
- HTTP_REFERER medium quality measure (browser based)
- Hashed passwords

HTTP_REFERER check

- When clicking on a URL on a web page (or posting a FORM) usually brings the "source" URL to the target
- The web browser controls this behaviour
 - Depends on the client's browser
 - Custom-hacked browsers can modify this value
 - Spoofable, even if difficult for the average user
 - Proxies and firewalls can modify this value
- http://www.w3.org/Security/faq/wwwsf2.html



HTTP_REFERER tests

- Upload/Download Scripts modified during IPAC2011
- Now it is possible to configure a number of URLs as valid referrers in the configuration file
- A global password can override this behaviour (for direct downloads in batch – Volker's JPSP)
- Unfortunately... doesn't work!



IPAC2011 "production" tests

• SPMS @ CERN RSP

Oracle infrastructure (web/application server)

• File server @ ESS Bilbao

- Ubuntu Linux 10.04 LTS



Debugging: CERN \rightarrow ESS

```
JACoW file upload (Perl) - DEBUG
OPTIONS:
{
        'timeout' => 600,
        'debug' \Rightarrow 1,
         'referer' => 0,
REFERER ==
Server filesystem type: Unix.
Client platform detected: Linux
FILENAME PARTS (NAME, DIR, EXT):
  FRYCA01.txt
  ./
uploaded_file_info {
    'Content-Type' => 'text/plain',
    'Content-Disposition' => 'form-data; name="file_name"; filename="FRYCA01.txt"'
}
```



Debugging: Elettra \rightarrow ESS

```
JACoW file upload (Perl) - DEBUG
OPTIONS:
{
         'timeout' => 600,
         'debug' \Rightarrow 1,
         'referer' \Rightarrow 0,
REFERER == http://localhost/~ivan/IPAC2011/file upload.html
Server filesystem type: unix.
Client platform detected: Linux
FILENAME PARTS (NAME, DIR, EXT):
FRYCA01.txt
./
uploaded_file_info {
    'Content-Type' => 'text/plain',
    'Content-Disposition' => 'form-data; name="file_name"; filename="FRYCA01.txt"'
}
```



Debugging: CERN \rightarrow Elettra

```
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}
```



Another solution

- Preshared key in SPMS & Scripts
- The SPMS could send (in clear) a HASH of the password and the paper code
- The Scripts could check the HASH against the known preshared key
- A different HASH for each paper ID not usable for crosspaper ID spoofing



What's needed for this method

- Agree on a hash algorithm (MD5? SHA1? ...)
- Modify the SPMS code to pass this hash

- easy (Matt)

Modify the Scripts to use/check this hash

– easy (Ivan)

• Use it!

- easy (*)



Conclusions

- We can improve security
- Modifying the upload/download scripts isn't enough
- With small changes to SPMS and UDS we can strengthen the SPMS