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dumping

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TUOCMH03 Initial Experience with the Machine Protection System for LHC beam-losses, interlocks, injection, kicker 1277
 
  • R. Schmidt, R.W. Assmann, B. Dehning, M. FERRO-LUZZI, B. Goddard, M. Lamont, A.P. Siemko, J.A. Uythoven, J. Wenninger, M. Zerlauth
    CERN, Geneva
 
 

Nominal beam parameters at 7TeV/c will only be reached after some years of operation, with each proton beam having a stored energy of 360MJ. However, a small fraction of this energy is sufficient to damage accelerator equipment or experiments in case of uncontrolled beam loss. The correct functioning of the machine protection systems is vital during the different operational phases already for initial operation. When operating the complex magnet system, with and without beam, safe operation relies on the protection and interlock systems for the superconducting circuits. For safe injection and transfer of beam from SPS to LHC, transfer line parameters are monitored, beam absorbers must be in the correct position and the LHC must be ready to accept beam. At the end of a fill and in case of failures beams must be properly extracted onto the dump blocks, for some failures within less than few hundred microseconds. Safe operation requires many systems: beam dumping system, beam interlocks, beam instrumentation, equipment monitoring, collimators and absorbers, etc. We describe the commissioning of the LHC machine protection system and the experience during the initial operation.

 

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TUPEB062 Beam Commissioning and Performance Characterisation of the LHC Beam Dump Kicker Systems kicker, extraction, beam-losses, injection 1659
 
  • J.A. Uythoven, E. Carlier, L. Ducimetière, B. Goddard, V. Kain, N. Magnin
    CERN, Geneva
 
 

The LHC beam dump system was commissioned with beam in 2009. This paper describes the operational experience with the kicker systems and the tests and measurements to qualify them for operation. The kicker performance was characterized with beam by measurements of the kicker waveforms using bunches extracted at different times along the kicker sweep. The kicker performance was also continuously monitored for each pulse with measurement and analysis of each kick pulse, allowing diagnostic of errors and of long-term drifts. The results are described and compared to the expectations.

 
WEPEB072 First Operation of the Abort Gap Monitor for LHC synchrotron, proton, simulation, radiation 2863
 
  • T. Lefèvre, S. Bart Pedersen, A. Boccardi, E. Bravin, A. Goldblatt, A. Jeff, F. Roncarolo
    CERN, Geneva
  • A.S. Fisher
    SLAC, Menlo Park, California
 
 

The LHC beam dump system relies on extraction kickers that need 3 microseconds to rise up to their nominal field. As a consequence, particles crossing the kickers during this rise time will not be dumped properly. The proton population during this time should remain below quench and damage limits at all times. A specific monitor has been designed to measure the particle population in this gap. It is based on the detection of Synchrotron radiation using a gated photomultiplier. Since the quench and damage limits change with the beam energy, the acceptable population in the abort gap and the settings of the monitor must be adapted accordingly. This paper presents the design of the monitor, the calibration procedure and the detector performance with beam.

 
WEPEB073 The CERN Beam Interlock System: Principle and Operational Experience monitoring, extraction, power-supply, status 2866
 
  • B. Puccio, A. Castañeda, M. Kwiatkowski, I. Romera, B. Todd
    CERN, Geneva
 
 

A complex Machine Protection System has been designed to protect the LHC machine from an accidental release of the beam energy, with about 20 subsystems providing status information to the Beam Interlock System (BIS). Only if the subsystems are in the correct state for beam operation, the BIS receives a status flag and beam can be injected into LHC. The BIS also relays commands from the connected subsystems in case of failure for emergency extraction of beam to the LHC Beam Dump Block. To maintain the required level of safety of the BIS, the performance of the key components is verified before every fill of the machine and validated after every emergency beam dump before beam operation is allowed to continue. This includes all critical paths, starting from the inputs from connected system triggering a beam dump request, followed by the correct interruption and propagation sequence of the two redundant beam permit loops until the final extraction of the beam via the LHC beam dumping system. In this paper we report about the experience with the BIS that has been deployed for some years in the SPS (as LHC injector), in the transfer lines between SPS and LHC and recently in LHC.