Machine Protection Issues for eRHIC

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
Oct. 6 - 11, 2013


ICALEPCS 2013

- Overview of RHIC & eRHIC (3 slides)
 - RHIC Capabilities & Operation Experience
 - eRHIC Capabilities
- RHIC Machine Protection Systems (3 slides)
 - Permit systems and Beam Dump
- Energy in Beams for eRHIC (2 slides)
- Dependability Issues for eRHIC (2 slides)
 - Categories of beam loss
 - Types of failures
- Reliability Analysis & Design Preparation (2 slides)
- Dumping the eRHIC beams (2 slides)
- Summary




RHIC – a High Luminosity (Polarized) Hadron Collider







eRHIC Operation






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Layers in Protection






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Beam Permit System

Permit Link





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RHIC Beam Permit & Beam Dump

- 3 Permit Link systems
 - Beam Permit link
 - Blue ring Quench Permit Link
 - Yellow ring Quench Permit Link
 - 10 MHz carrier is monitored on each link
- Beam dump/abort kickers
 - One for each Ring (Blue/Yellow)
 - Redundant interface modules to permit links
- Two primary permit drops
 - Non-quench beam permit drop
 - Abort kickers fire, injection beam switch dropped
 - Quench permit drop
 - Additionally, magnet currents are dumped.



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Energy in the Beams


	Electrons	Protons	² He ³	⁷⁹ Au ¹⁹⁷	92U238	
Energy	10	250	167	100	100	GeV
#bunches	180	111	111	111	111	
Intensity/bunch*	3.6	10	6.0	6.0	6.0	1010
Energy Deposited	62**	89	178	107	107	kJoule

• At 10 GeV, the electron beam has 62 kJ of energy and will deposit ~810 MW of power into the dump.

* intensity/bunch is in units of # nucleons (e.g., 6e10 Au nucleons = 3.6e8 Au ions)
** assumes 6 turns of 180 bunches simultaneously stored in eRHIC ring



Energy Loss in Normal Operation





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How to protect eRHIC?

eRHIC beam losses can be classified as

- 1. Ultra-fast: Losses that occur in less than 6 turns, or 77 microseconds.
 - Collimation
- 2. Fast: Losses that occur in more than 77 microseconds but less than 10 milliseconds.
 - Fast beam abort system
- 3. Intermediate: Losses that occur in less than 10 seconds.
 - Reduce beam current (automated), or
 - Fast beam abort system (if not fast enough)
- 4. Slow: Losses that occur in less than 100 seconds
 - Beam current can be dropped or turned off and problem corrected (or dumped if not fast enough)
- 5. Steady State: Anything longer than 100 seconds.
 - Beam current can be dropped and problem corrected

•All systems will be monitored and will alarm/notify.



Types of Failures?

- The MP prevents damage to equipment.
- What happens when it doesn't do what it is "suppose" to do?
- Two categories of these types of failures
 - Logic errors in the design/implementation
 - Component failures
 - Since all the systems are automated, human error fits into the logic errors category
- Regardless of type of failure, two modes of concern
 - Failsafe modes: system aborts beam, etc.
 - Blind modes: system enters state that prevents abort = These are most dangerous!



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<u>Overview</u>

- Reliability analysis of RHIC MPS (as an integral part of eRHIC MPS) with decision support for additional system for electron ring
- Initial step: BPS takes active decision
- Analyzing the probability of occurrence of crucial system failures: false beam abort, false quench, blind, dirty dump
- Identification of failure prone components
- Impact of design configuration of modules



<u>Stages</u>


- 1. To find system failures probabilities*
 - A modular, multistate, dynamic reliability model of BPS using competing risks theory
 - Implemented as a Monte Carlo Simulation
- 2. To find failure rates for failure modes**
 - Fault Tree Analysis of BPS modules
 - Determine vulnerable components
 - Module failure rates serve as an input to stage 1

Two of yesterday's posters, for more details on Simulation and Fault Tree Analysis *MOPPC075 : A Monte Carlo Simulation Approach to the Reliability Modeling . . . **MOPPC076 : Quantitative Fault Tree Analysis . . .



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




- During beam abort, the number of accelerating bunches and decelerating bunches should be identical to avoid over-power/under-power SRF cavities.
- One beam dump at 10 GeV arc.
- One beam dump at one of the two 0.6GeV beam line.
- Additional beam dumps, if necessary, could be added to reduce response time.
- The relative timing of the abort kickers depends on their locations and is critical for keeping energy compensation in LINACs.



Fitting the high energy dump?







- eRHIC beams are powerful enough to damage equipment.
- eRHIC has new challenges both in response time and types and number of systems that get included in the machine protection systems.
- Dependability analysis is a critical part of the design process and helps identify blind failure modes in the MP systems
- We are well on the way to identifying key design features that will be implemented to improve the RHIC and eRHIC MP systems.


Thank You !








RHIC Performance



BROOKHAVEN

RHIC Performance





RHIC Beam Permit & Beam Dump

- RHIC Magnet Systems
 - 1740 superconducting magnets over 2.5 miles
 - LHe Refrigerator operates at 4.5° K
 - Cold power interface quench protection
 - Bypass diodes during quench
 - Dump resistors switch in during quench
 - Quench detection primarily via voltage tap monitors on groups of magnets
- Other Systems
 - Vacuum interlocks
 - 382 beam loss monitor detectors
 - External radiation interlock systems
 - Access controls interlocks



Post Mortem Analysis

- Permit drops initiate high frequency data dumps of
 - Beam loss monitors
 - Magnet waveforms
 - Beam position monitors
 - Permit module data/timestamps
 - Quench detector data
- Automatic analysis is performed to help categorize the cause of the beam dump
 - Quench analysis
 - PS analysis

